This week Dr. Condoleeza Rice will appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify in connection with her nomination to be Secretary of State. She will face polite but pointed questioning from the Senators on a broad range of issues, with a heavy emphasis on U.S. policy toward Iraq, but also on other pressing challenges, including, in particular, the U.S. strategy on North Korea's nuclear program and the stalled six party talks. As is typically the case in confirmation hearings, the answers are likely to be guarded, breaking little new ground. So the important question is not what she will say in the hearing, or whether she will gain confirmation (that is all but guaranteed), but rather what policies she and her new team at the State Department will pursue during President Bush's second four year term.
A careful analysis suggests that we will see a subtle mix of both continuity and change. The reasons for continuity are obvious, beginning with Bush himself, who rarely expresses doubt or misgivings about the policy decisions he has made in the past. The president therefore can be expected to hold steadily to his strongly held views about an aggressive strategy of forcefully taking on America's enemies, rewarding those countries who support U.S. policy, while dismissing critics at home and abroad who believe that U.S. standing in the world has declined over the past four years.
The element of continuity is equally clear in the core national security personnel, where there has been some reshuffling of the deck, but not a single new face in any of the top Cabinet or Deputy Cabinet positions. Of particular importance is the continued strong role played by the vice president and his large national security staff, who can be expected to advocate "staying the course." And, of course, the replacement of Secretary Powell by Bush's highly loyal national security adviser at the State Department can be expected to have the affect of assuring that all the elements of the national security community are fully committed to the president's program.
Yet there are also reasons to expect some elements of change, in part because of developments beyond the Administration's control, and in part because of the shifting roles played by the president's advisers in the second term. The most prominent factor of change is the continued constraints that the war in Iraq is placing on the United States' ability to pursue other foreign policy goals. The war has tied down significant portions of the U.S. military (particularly the Army) and absorbed an extraordinary amount of resources. It has colored attitudes around the world, particularly in countries with large Islamic populations, but also more broadly in Europe and in East Asia, where the war's unpopularity makes it more difficult for friendly governments to gain support for pro-U.S. policies. As a result, the Administration now seems to recognize that it must put on a more friendly face to win back the world's good will.
Equally important is the new cast of characters at the State Department. During the first term, many foreign governments, including those in East Asia, looked to the State Department to act as counterweight to what they saw as more hardline elements in the Bush Administration. Powell was seen as a practical moderate, and his Deputy, Rich Armitage, an experienced practitioner with a deep insight into the concerns and perspectives of East Asians. They brought with them Jim Kelly, another old hand well known to East Asians. The news that these "friends" were departing at the end of the first term brought out feelings of anxiety, especially in East Asia.
As the identity of the new team begins to emerge at the State Department, there are more questions than answers as to their likely impact on U.S. foreign policy generally, and on the Asia Pacific region. At first blush, the appointments have raised mix responses in East Asia. On the one hand, there are no strong "Asia hands" in the top leadership. Dr. Rice has limited experience in her career in East Asia; she made her mark as a Russian specialist on the NSC under the first President Bush. Bob Zoellick has been deeply involved in trade issues in the region, under both Presidents Bush, but is perhaps most known for his work in negotiating German reunification. The apparent choice for Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, is ambassador to NATO and a former Ambassador to Greece, who also took over Condi Rice's Russia post at the NSC. And most surprising of the high level personnel decisions is the apparent choice of U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill to be Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. Although Ambassador Hill was recently appointed as Ambassador to Korea (and served an early stint in Seoul as an economic officer nearly twenty years ago), his long and distinguished career has largely focused on Europe: as Ambassador to Poland and Macedonia, Senior Director for Southeast Europe at the NSC and Special Envoy to Kosovo.
Yet many also take comfort that this is highly experienced team who are seen as mainstream internationalists and other, more ideological candidates did not secure high-level positions. Even though their experience in Asia is limited, both Zoellick and Hill already have a reputation of sensitivity to the interests and perspectives of people in the region. How might this team change U.S. foreign policy, particularly in East Asia?
First, we can expect far greater emphasis on public diplomacy and trying to improve America's image abroad. Dr. Rice has already let it be known that she intends to travel abroad frequently a clear contrast with her travel averse predecessor. The president's decision to make an early visit to Europe, and the belated but now high visibility U.S. role on tsunami relief are two other indicators of the Administration's new awareness of this problem.
Second, the State Department is likely to place substantially increased emphasis on the economic dimension of America's relations with the rest of the world, including Asia. Zoellick's long suit is international economic policy, from his days at the Treasury Department and as Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs in the Bush 41 State Department, to his recent tenure as U.S. Trade Representative, where he has had extensive engagement with East Asia through the negotiation of the FTAs with Singapore and Australia, to the trade agreement with Vietnam, to completing the accession of China and Taiwan to the WTO. This background provides a strong contrast with the security policy orientation of Powell/Armitage team at State, which paid little attention to economic affairs, particularly in Asia. This does not necessarily mean new trade friction Zoellick gained substantial credit in Europe for developing a constructive partnership with the EU Trade Commissioner, defusing many long-standing disputes, most recently between Boeing and Airbus. And it could mean an increasing U.S. engagement with East Asia through APEC (which Zoellick helped launch during Bush 41) and other East Asia structures which have been rather neglected during the first Bush term.
Third, the State Department voice is likely to get a stronger hearing in interagency disputes. The presence at State of the former national security and the former Trade Representative means that two individuals with strong track records in the first term will be fighting for the State Department from the inside in contrast with the almost conscious "outsider" posture adopted by Powell and Armitage. And Hill, too, has a well deserved reputation as an effective bureaucratic player not to mention an ability to take on tough negotiations with both friends and adversaries, most notably with Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia which could serve him well in shaping strategy for the negotiations with North Korea.
But on the substantive details of U.S. policy, it is simply too soon to predict. Will there be an evolution in the U.S. negotiating posture towards North Korea? A new negotiator (particularly one who has just spent five months in Seoul) will undoubtedly have new ideas, but most of the proponents of the current hardline approach are likely to remain in government. Will the U.S. take a tougher approach towards China's currency policy? Undoubtedly State will play a bigger role on the question with Zoellick as Deputy, but that doesn't necessarily imply a more confrontational approach. So on these and many other issues, expect a new look and feel, but not dramatic departures, as the Rice era begins at State.
