On June 28, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) Commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Jost stated that the authority of American forces stationed in Japan would be gradually expanded, citing escalating threats from China in the Indo-Pacific region. The shift signals a more assertive U.S. military posture in Japan—but one that could come at the expense of American forces in South Korea. Within the Trump administration, some officials have reportedly proposed that, alongside the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) be downgraded from a three-star to a two-star general. Simultaneously, the USFJ commander—currently a three-star—would be elevated to a four-star post and assume the additional role of United Nations Command (UNC) commander. The United States is expected to outline new deployment frameworks for both USFK and USFJ in its forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS), which could be released as early as August.
Reports indicate that USFK has already adopted an internally developed training map of East Asia, rotated vertically, under the direction of Commander Xavier Brunson. On this map, Taiwan and the Philippines are positioned more prominently than North Korea, and the distance from Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek—USFK’s headquarters—to cities such as Taipei and Manila is clearly marked. The unconventional map reflects the U.S. military’s growing emphasis on “strategic flexibility,” signaling the need for USFK to be ready to redeploy in response to contingencies, including a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan or conflict in the South China Sea.
Since the start of the Trump administration, speculation has persisted over a potential reduction or redeployment of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth commented, “The U.S. doesn’t need to be everywhere, all the time.” Commander Brunson characterized South Korea as “an aircraft carrier between Japan and China” and added, “Sometimes, we need to move elsewhere.” While South Korean President Lee Jae-myung dismissed the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as “about as likely as aliens invading Earth,” the U.S. defense secretary has warned that such a scenario could become reality as early as 2027. Analysts caution that if China launches an attack on Taiwan, it could simultaneously provoke North Korea to open a second front on the Korean Peninsula—an outcome with grave implications.
Amid these developments, the South Korean government is moving ahead with President Lee’s campaign pledge to reclaim wartime operational control during his term. The Presidential Transition Committee has identified OPCON transfer as the top defense priority and is preparing a roadmap to submit to the presidential office in the coming weeks. If South Korea proceeds with the OPCON transition, the implications must be carefully considered. The U.S. military has long held a policy against placing American forces under foreign command. Given current sentiments in U.S. defense circles, there is a tangible risk that USFK could be downgraded and placed under the operational authority of USFJ. Over time, this could lead to a steady drawdown of American military presence on the Korean Peninsula. The question then becomes: what does South Korea stand to gain? And will it be enough to justify what could be lost?
