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#허상1:“미국은 언제라도 북한을 공격할 기세다.”이 오해는 나와 백악관의 동료들을 가장 곤혹스럽게 했던 것이다. 조지 W 부시 대통령이 2002년 서울에서 “북한을 공격하거나 침략할 의도가 전혀 없다”고 밝힌 말은 액면 그대로 받아들여졌어야 했다. 물론 미국은 외교관계에 있어서 언제나 모든 선택 가능성을 열어두지만, 그렇다고 해서 실제로 대북 군사적 공격이 한번이라도 적극 고려됐다는 뜻은 아니다. 사람들은 1994년 클린턴 행정부가 북한 영변을 공격하려 했다고 생각하고, 따라서 이번 외교가 실패하면 즉각 군사 행동으로 갈 것이라고 단정한다. 클린턴이 실제로 그랬든 않든, 지금은 1994년이 아니다. 북한의 고농축우라늄(HEU) 프로그램은 지하에 숨어 있어 공격이 어렵다. 게다가 지금 북한은 보복 위협을 줄 수 있는 미사일과 대량살상무기를 그때보다 훨씬 많이 보유하고 있다. 또한 미국은, 북한이 미국의 공격 위협을 구실로 삼아 (6자회담에 참여한) 주변 강대국들을 분열시키고 대미(對美) 압력을 가중시키려 하는 만큼 이것이 오히려 북한을 외교적으로 도와주는 셈이 된다는 것을 알아챘다.
#허상2:“미 행정부 내 ‘강경파’들이 제4차 6자회담의 합의를 훼손하기 위해 북한에 경제 제재를 가하기로 음모를 꾸몄다.”물론 미국 재무부가 작년 9월 미국 은행들에 대해 마카오의 방코델타아시아은행(BDA)과의 거래를 금지시킨 데 대해서는 ‘왜 하필 이때인가’라는 의문을 가질 수도 있다. 북한이 수퍼노트(아주 정교한 미화100달러짜리 위조지폐)를 만들고 마약을 밀매하는 것은 몇 년간 알려진 사실이다. 그렇지만 미 재무부가 북한의 불법 자금 흐름을 포착한 것은 9·11 테러 후 금융전문가들이 테러집단으로 유입되는 자금을 차단하기 위해 ‘검은’ 돈의 흐름을 집중 조사하면서였다. 일단 증거를 잡게 된 이상, 미국은 6자회담의 상황 여하와는 상관없이, 미국 경제와 국제 경제를 보호하기 위한 법률 이행 조치를 취하지 않을 수 없었다. 궁극적으로는, 북한의 불법적 자금 흐름을 차단함으로써 북한으로 하여금 다른 나라들과 합법적인 경제 협력을 강화하도록 유도할 수 있을 것이다.
#허상3:“미국은 북한의 정권 교체를 위해 인권을 들먹인다.” 부시 대통령은 북한 김정일 위원장의 주민 통치에 비판적인 말을 해 왔는데, 그 때문에 북한은 대화를 그만두겠다는 위협을 하고 나섰다. 하지만 6자회담 방식을 처음 제안한 것은 바로 부시 대통령이었고, 미국이 스스로 제안한 회담을 저버리려 할 리가 없다. 미국은 최근 북한 인권특사를 임명했다. 그는 각국 정부·비정부단체(NGO)들과 협력해 북한 주민들의 상황을 개선할 조용한 방법을 찾으려고 애쓸 것이다. 6자회담의 틀을 깨지 않고서도 북한 주민들을 도울 수 있다.
어떠한 양자 관계에도 다소의 흠은 있는 법이다. 그러나 한미 동맹은 민주주의라는 공통의 가치와 양국 관계의 안정과 번영이라는 공통의 이익에 바탕을 두고 있다. 미국의 대북 정책을 둘러싼 부정적 허상들을 없애는 것은 한미가 공동의 목표를 성취하는 데도 도움이 될 것이다.
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Eyewitness to U.S.-ROK Relations: Lessons from Five Years in the White House By Michael J. Green For Chosun Ilbo If somebody landed from another planet and just read the media, they would ask whether the U.S. and Republic of Korea are allies or enemies. The press in both countries seems to play up every small statement as a crisis or as further evidence of a strategic divergence between Seoul and Washington. For almost five years I worked in the National Security Council on Asia policy and especially U.S.-Korea relations for President Bush, and I come away from the experience optimistic about U.S.-ROK relations but concerned at how negatively the media portrays the relationship. Perhaps the Bush Administration should have done a better job communicating and not all the blame lies with the media. Whatever the cause, it is time to put to bed the myths that have gained so much currency the past few years. Myth Number One: “Washington is constantly on the edge of a military strike against North Korea.” This one was always most frustrating for me and my colleagues at the White House. The fact that President Bush said in Seoul in February 2002 that he has “no intention to attack or invade North Korea” should have been clear enough. In diplomacy the U.S. always leaves all options open, but that does not mean a military strike has ever been actively considered as an option. People assume that in 1994 the Clinton administration was on the verge of attacking Yongbyon and conclude that this time a failure of diplomacy will lead immediately to the military option. Whether or not the Clinton administration was really about to attack Yongbyon is debatable, but in any case, this is not 1994. First of all, the North’s HEU program is hidden underground and cannot be struck. Moreover, the DPRK now has a far larger inventory of missiles and WMD to threaten the region in retaliation. And Washington has learned that the threat of U.S. military strikes only helps Pyongyang diplomatically by allowing the North to ratchet up tension and fear of war in order to divide the other powers in the region and turn the pressure on Washington. The multilateral approach is better -- five parties quietly being firm with the North is far more effective than one party the U.S.threatening force. Myth Number Two: “U.S. “hardliners” have conspired to undercut the agreement in the fourth round of talks by using economic pressure against North Korea’s financial flows.” Understandably, people ask “why now” about the U.S. Treasury Department’s September notification that under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act U.S. banks can no longer have correspondent relations with the Banco Delta Asia which had been laundering North Korean illegal funds. The fact that North Korea has been counterfeiting U.S. $100 Supernotes and commercial drugs and cigarettes and exporting illegal drugs has been well known for several years, spotlighted by the capture of the 2002 Pongsu ship off of Australia and other high profile law enforcement cases. However, the U.S. Treasury Department only came to understand the flow of North Korean illegal funds through banks like Banco Delta Asia when experts increased scrutiny of all “dark” money flows after 9-11 in order to cut financing for terrorism. That effort had the side effect of spotlighting North Korean illegal money flows. Confronted with evidence of these illegal North Korean activities and presented with information on where the money was going, the U.S. and other governments had no choice other than to enforce the law and protect the U.S. and international economy. Ultimately, these actions will probably support the long-term goal of the Six Party Talks by taking away North Korea’s significant flow of illegal cash and forcing Pyongyang to seriously implement the September 19th agreement in order to raise revenue through legitimate economic cooperation with the other parties. But the action taken against Banco Delta Asia was a law enforcement decision that had to be made at that time regardless of the status of the nuclear negotiations: positive or negative. Myth Number Three: “The U.S. only talks about human rights in order to achieve regime change in the North.” President Bush has said critical things about Kim Jong Il’s treatment of his people that have caused Pyongyang to threaten an end to diplomacy. Pyongyang uses this tactic in order to get the other parties to pressure the U.S. not to focus on the miserable condition of the North Korean people. It was President Bush who first proposed the Six Party format and so Washington has no interest in sabotaging its own idea. Nevertheless, the North Korean people continue to suffer and the administration in Washington is determined to find some way to quietly improve their position. The U.S. has proposed five fold increases in food assistance to the North in exchange for modest improvements in monitoring. The North refused and recently forced out the World Food Program. The U.S. has now appointed a North Korean Human Rights Envoy who will work with other governments and NGOs to try to find quiet ways to help the North Korean people improve their situation. The September agreement also provides a framework for taking steps to help the North Korean people. It is possible to focus on helping the average North Korean without threatening the diplomacy of the Six Party Talks. Indeed, President Bush and President Roh agreed in their November joint statement that they shared such a commitment. No bilateral relationship is free of blemishes, but the U.S.-ROK alliance is founded on the common values of democracy and the common interests of stability and prosperity. These common values and interests have allowed President Bush and President Roh to work together to realign U.S. forces in Korea, launch the Six Party Talks, and now start a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiation that will pressure Japan and China to liberalize and further solidify the ROK as the economic “hub” of Northeast Asia. Putting away the negative myths about the U.S. North Korean policy will help the U.S. and ROK achieve even more of these successes. |
