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The Second Bush Administration and the Outlook on Its North Korean Policy: "Odd Man Out?" By David Kang Associate Professor, Government Department, Dartmouth College Now that Bush is reelected and the new advisers on foreign policy have been installed, what can we expect from them on its approach toward the Korean peninsula in the next 4 years? It is no exaggeration to state that while there has been no noticeable progress on the NK issue during the first Bush administration, there has continued to be considerable change among the countries in the northeast Asia region on economic and diplomatic fronts. If this is indeed the case, what are the US options, when the NK regime has survived for more than almost anyone expected, the probability of its demise seems to be rather low ? One option is to take into account the changing NE Asia geopolitical situation carefully and develop a rational, flexible, long-term strategy [vis a vis NK]. Another option is to continue its hardline policy. If the latter path is chosen, little progress is envisioned in solving the NK nuclear issue, due to the fact that America's attention is almost entirely focused on the Iraq situation at the present time. And even if they [US] does address the NK issue, their mutual distrust is so deep that the prospect of either side giving an inch is remote at best. In other words, the issue has not got off the starting gate, and the current stalemate is likely to continue in the future. One thing to note is that for three years NK has chosen not to cross a "red line," by testing a nuclear weapon or testing an intercontinental ballistic missile. If NK continues to restrain itself, then it is likely that other East Asian countries involved in the six-party talks will not support US policies designed to increase pressure on NK. Moreover, [while there is much skepticism about Kim Jongi;'s intentions], Nk's open-market policy is accelerating, notably it has abandoned its centrally planned economy and allows supply and demand to et prices. The North has also moved forward on the creation of special economic zones. These changes have greatly affected the citizens of NK, and, once unleashed, it will be difficult to return to its previous economic situation. The NE Asian countries welcome such changes in NK. As examples, during the last 4 years, the trade between China and NK rapidly increased, along with reports that Kim Jong-il himself has visited Shanghai industrial zones three times in the last 1-1/2 years.(?) The trade between SK and NK has become increasingly active in recent years, and in the last month, Seoul announced that it would open an official government liaison office in NK, to work with the DPRK on developing the north's abundant mineral deposits. Likewise Japan, although asserting that resolution of the nuclear issue is a priority, PM Koizumi suggested that normalization of ties with NK is a realistic goal. Russia, not to be left behind, is in talks with both NK and SK about building an oil pipeline into the peninsula. Under these conditions, and considering the negligible progress on the nuclear issue due to the recalcitrant stances on the parts of the US and Nk, the way to break the current deadlock and move toward some sort of resolution in NE Asia is to continue to encourage NK's open economic policy and for the NE Asia countries to forge a united and coherent strategy. Stated another way, the new Bush administration must decide whether to cooperate with NE Asia countries with the changed geopolitical environment, or to ignore these and unilaterally concentrate only on the nuclear issue. The Bush administration must also ask whether the economic reform in NK will ultimately accelerate NK political change, or whether to attempt to isolate the North, and which strategy is more effective in result in bringing benefit to the US. If the current NE Asian countries' policy of economic cooperation and trade were to bear fruit, then it is not inconceivable that the US itself -- not NK -- may become the "odd man out."
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